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1. historiCal baCKground
In the spring of 1940, the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) 
executed almost 22,000 Polish citizens held as both prisoners-of-war (POWs) and tak-
en prisoner on other grounds after the Soviet Union had marched in September 1939 
into the eastern provinces of pre-war Poland following the conclusion of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact signed between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. The shootings 
followed a decision taken on 5 March 1940 by the Politburo of the Soviet Union’s 
Communist Party, the highest organ of the Soviet Union. A proposal to approve the 
executions was submitted by Lavrentiy Beria, head of the NKVD. He specified that 
Polish prisoners were “enemies of the Soviet authorities and full of hatred towards the 
Soviet system”.
These mass killings of Polish citizens are commonly known as the Katyń mas-
sacre, named after the forest near Smolensk where the graves of some of the victims 
were discovered and excavated by Germans in 1943. In fact, the Katyń forest was 
only one of the execution and burial sites. Bodies of 4,421 prisoners-of-war from the 
Kozelsk POW camp are buried there. Prisoners-of-war from the Starobelsk (3,820) 
and Ostashkov camps (6,311) are buried in Pyatikhatki (near Kharkiv) and Med-
noye (near Tver) respectively. The circumstances of the executions of the prisoners 
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from the prisons of western Ukraine and Belarus (7,305) remain unknown to 
date.1
The precise numbers of murdered prisoners were given in a note which Alexander 
Shelepin, Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), wrote on 3 March 1959 
to Nikita Khrushchev, Secretary General of the USSR Communist Party. It specified 
that a total of 21,857 people had been executed in 1940. Shelepin also recommended 
the destruction of all personal records of the persons shot by the NKVD.2 The remain-
ing documents were to be put into a special file, known as “Package Number One”, 
and sealed. In Soviet times, this package was one of the strictest secrets of the USSR 
and only the Secretary General of the USSR Communist Party had the right of access 
to the file.
The Politburo’s decision to execute Polish citizens was also accompanied by a mass 
deportation of the families of the prisoners to remote regions of the Soviet Union. 
About 59,000 people were deported, a significant percentage of them being children.3
Following excavations of the graves in the Katyń Forest in 1943, the Soviet authori-
ties put the blame for the massacre on the Germans. In the course of the trial of Ger-
man war criminals before the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, the Soviet 
prosecutor even attempted to charge the German forces with the shooting of “up to 
11,000 Polish prisoners in the autumn of 1941 at Katyń”. The tribunal did not refer to 
this charge in its judgement.4
Only on 13 April 1990 did the Soviet Union affirm (a communiqué of the TASS 
official news agency) that the murders had been perpetrated by the NKVD. Several sets 
of criminal cases were subsequently commenced, which eventually became investiga-
tion no. 159 conducted by the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office in Moscow. In 1992 
the contents of “Package Number One” were made public, and the following year cop-
1 There are dozens of books in English on the Katyń massacre, e.g. J.K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest: 
The Story of the Katyń Forest Massacre, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame: 1962 (several edi-
tions); A. Paul, Katyń: The Untold Story of Stalin’s Polish Massacre, C. Scribner’s Sons, New York: 1991; 
A.M. Cienciala, W. Materski, N.S. Lebedeva (eds.), Katyń: A Crime Without Punishment, Yale University 
Press, New Haven: 2008; L. FitzGibbon, Katyń Forest Massacre, Anna Livia Books, New York: 1975; 
J.H. Lauck, Katyń Killings: In the Record, Kingston Press, Clifton: 1988; The Katyń Forest Massacre: Hearings 
before the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence and Circumstances of the Katyń 
Forest Massacre, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1952.
2 However, no documents (such as e.g. commonly used destruction protocols) confirm that the de-
struction of such records has actually been performed.
3 A directive on the deportation was issued by Lavrentiy Beria on 7 March 1940, two days after the 
Politburo’s decision on the executions. During the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland there were four 
waves of forced deportations. Relying only on Soviet data, about 330,000-340,000 were deported.
4 See the indictment published at Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military 
Tribunal, Nuremberg 1947, vol. I, pp. 42-54. In the course of the proceedings before the IMT Mr. R.A. 
Rudenko, Chief Prosecutor for the USSR, referred to the to the Katyń massacre as “the mass shooting of 
Polish officers by the Fascist criminals in Katyń Forest”, “criminal activity” (vol. XV, p. 289), “mass shoot-
ing of Poles”, “a link in the chain of many bestial crimes perpetrated by the Hitlerites” (vol. XV, p. 290), 
“atrocities at Katyń” (vol. IX, p. 28).
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ies of the documents were handed over to the Polish side (including Beria’s motion of 
5 March 1940, the Politburo’s decision of the same date, the pages removed from the 
minutes of the Politburo’s meeting, and Shelepin’s notes from 3 March 1959).5
On 13 June 1994, Anatoly Yablokov, head of the prosecutors conducting the Katyń 
investigation, filed a motion for a decision to discontinue the investigation due to the 
deaths of those persons responsible for the crime. He proposed that Stalin and the other 
members of the Politburo be considered guilty of the Katyń massacre on the basis of 
Articles 6a and 6b of the Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, 
(i.e. guilty of crimes against peace, against humanity, and war crimes), as well as the 
crime of genocide aimed at Polish citizens. He also argued that those who had carried 
out illegal orders were subject to harsh penalties (including the death penalty) accord-
ing to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, and that the Katyń massacre was 
not subject to the statute of limitations. Yablokov’s motion was rejected by the Chief 
Military Prosecutor’s Office. Yablokov himself was then dismissed6 and the Katyń case 
was assigned to another investigator. 
Criminal case no. 159 was eventually closed on 21 September 2004. On 22 Decem-
ber 2004, the Interagency Commission for the Protection of State Secrets classified 36 
volumes of the case file – out of a total of 183 volumes – as “top secret” and a further 
eight volumes as “for internal use only”. The decision to discontinue the investigation 
was given a “top-secret” classification and its existence was only revealed on 11 March 
2005 at a press conference given by Mr. A. Savienkov, Chief Military Prosecutor.
2. legal preparations for the suit at strasbourg
Following the first unofficial news (August 2004) that the Russian investigation on 
the Katyń massacre was to be closed, I published an article in the Polish daily newspa-
per Rzeczpospolita suggesting that if the information was true, then the relatives of the 
victims could bring a case against Russia to the European Court of Human Rights (the 
Court) and rely on several provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR or the Convention).7 After this publication I was contacted by Ms. Witomiła 
Wołk-Jezierska, daughter of an officer executed at Katyń, who asked me to turn the 
hypothesis I had written about into reality. 
As any application to the Court at Strasbourg must be preceded by legal steps taken 
at the national level (i.e. the requirement that all available national legal measures be 
exhausted), we initiated, together with Russian advocates Ms. Anna Stavitskaya and 
Mr. Roman Karpinskiy from Moscow, two sets of legal proceedings: 1) challenging the 
5 Key Soviet/Russian documents related to the Katyń massacre are available in English in: Cienciala et 
al., supra note 1.
6 He currently works as a barrister in Moscow.
7 The Rzeczpospolita daily newspaper has special coloured sections, including a “yellow pages” section 
focused on legal issues. My article was published on 18-19 September 2004, p. C3.
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decision to discontinue Russian case no. 159; and 2) for the rehabilitation of the massa-
cre victims under the statute on rehabilitation of victims of political persecutions (Law 
no. 1761-I of 18 October 1991). For practical reasons, the number of those represented 
in the two proceedings was limited to the relatives of 10 POWs.
Our requests were rejected by the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office and the Russian 
courts. They held that no evidence that the Polish citizens had been executed in 1940 
existed. What they could only establish was that some Poles had been kept in POW 
camps in the spring of 1940, but that they then “had disappeared”. As a consequence, 
the relatives represented in the proceedings did not have the required legal standing 
since the bodies of their family members had not been identified in the Russian investi-
gation. The Russian organs dismissed all evidence referring to the so-called dispatching 
lists (containing names of the POWs transported on particular dates “to the disposal 
of the NKVD”) and the results of the German excavation works at the Katyń forest in 
1943, when the remains of three people were identified.8 In the rehabilitation proceed-
ings the Russian courts stated that even if “hypothetically” Polish POWs might have 
been killed, it was not possible to determine the legal basis for the repression against 
them. All of these decisions were taken despite the fact that memorials had been erected 
on the burial sites (with personal commemorative plaques for each victim) and that the 
Russian authorities had on several occasions paid tribute there to those killed. 
My vision of the “Katyń complaint” evolved. The core question was whether it was 
feasible to rely on Article 2 of the ECHR, which protects the right to life. As the ECHR 
(signed on 4 November 1950) entered into legal force on 3 September 1953 and was 
ratified by the Russian Federation only on 5 May 1998, it was clear that it could not 
apply in its substantive aspect to the killings committed in 1940. But the right to life is 
not limited only to the prohibition against taking someone’s life (unless a few rigorously 
construed exceptions apply). It also requires Member States to conduct an efficient in-
vestigation (the so-called procedural obligation) in all cases of violent (or “suspicious”) 
death. Although the Strasbourg Court treated the procedural obligation as autonomous 
and detachable from the prohibition against taking someone’s life,9 it was not certain 
8 As already mentioned, in 1943 the Germans discovered only one of the burial sites (Katyń forest). Three 
soldiers out of the group of 10 were held in Kozelsk POW camp and following the execution were buried in 
the Katyń forest. The results of the 1943 exhumation, which was conducted with the participation of a group 
of foreign forensic experts, were published in Amtliches Material zum Massenmord von Katyń, Berlin 1943.
9 Therefore, even though a state (through its functionaries) is not found responsible for a given killing 
(death), that state can be found in violation of Article 2 if there was no required investigation into the kill-
ing. See e.g. Kaya v. Turkey, Application no. 22729/93, Judgement of 19 February 1998, paras. 74-78 and 
86-92; McKerr v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 28883/95, Judgement of 4 May 2001, paras. 116-
61; Scavuzzo-Hager and Others v. Switzerland, Application no. 41773/98, Judgement of 7 February 2006, 
paras. 53-69 and 80-86; Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands, Application no. 52391/99, Grand Chamber 
Judgement of 15 May 2007, paras. 286-89 and 323-57. Sometimes a breach of the procedural obligation un-
der Article 2 has been alleged even in the absence of any complaint as to the substantive aspect of Article 2 (e.g. 
Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy, Application no. 32967/96, Grand Chamber Judgement of 17 January 2002, paras. 
41-57; Byrzykowski v. Poland, Application no. 11562/05, Judgement of 27 June 2006, paras. 86 and 94-118; 
Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 32457/04, Judgement of 27 November 2007, para. 53.
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if the obligation to investigate under the ECHR could be invoked when a killing (or 
suspicious death) occurred before the ratification of the Convention by a given state. In 
this regard, the Strasbourg case law was contradictory and the relevant decisions of the 
Court yielded different answers.10
In the first ruling, in the joint cases of Moldovan and Others v. Romania and Rostaş 
and Others v. Romania, decided in 2001, the Court unanimously dismissed the com-
plaint raised under Article 2 because the anti-Roma riots in issue, which left several 
people dead, had occurred prior to the ratification of the ECHR by Romania.11 But 
only two years later in another case against Romania (Bălăşoiu v. Romania), the Court, 
by a unanimous vote, declared itself competent ratione temporis to deal with the proce-
dural limb of the application (lack of an efficient investigation), despite the fact that the 
alleged act of cruel treatment (prohibited as torture, inhuman or denigrating treatment 
under Article 3) had taken place before the accession date.12 
Although the second Romanian case, decided unanimously by the same chamber, 
might suggest that the Court was willing to correct its initial mistake made in the first 
decision (in its legal observations the Romanian government expressly referred the Court 
to its decision in Moldovan/Rostaş), it was rather risky to rely on assumptions not con-
firmed clearly in the ruling. The subsequent decisions of the Court seemed to have 
demonstrated that this cautious approach was justified. First, in Voroshilov v. Russia and 
Kholodovy v. Russia, the Court unanimously found the applications inadmissible as, re-
spectively, an act of torture13 and a fatal bomb attack14 had occurred prior to the ratifica-
tion date. Second, in Blečić v. Croatia the Court held, while dealing with the issue of its 
temporal competence, that it must be determined “in relation of the facts constitutive of 
the alleged interference”.15 Although that case concerned property matters, the construct 
of the “facts constitutive of the alleged interference” might suggest that, when applied to 
cases under Article 2 and 3, that construct would refer to killings and acts of maltreat-
ment. In other words, it might be assumed that only due to a killing (maltreatment) 
being the core event would an accessory and resulting obligation to investigate that kill-
ing (maltreatment) arise. When the killing (maltreatment) happens before the critical 
ratification date, there is no procedural obligation whatsoever under the ECHR in the 
post-ratification period. The Blečić ruling was not a preliminary decision on admissibil-
10 All those answers were given in decisions on the admissibility/non-admissibility of a case. They were 
not judgements on merits. 
11 Moldovan and Others v. Romania, appl. no. 41138/98; and Rostaş and Others v. Romania, Application 
no. 64320/98, both decisions of 13 March 2001.
12 Bălăşoiu v. Romania, Application no. 37424/97, decision of 2 September 2003.
13 Voroshilov v. Russia, Application no. 21501/02, decision of 6 December 2005. In the decision the 
Court stated that if it had not declared the case inadmissible it would have had to verify whether the appli-
cant had made “credible assertions” as the facts which were contested by the government. This might sug-
gest that if the government does not question the facts of the alleged violation occurring in the pre-ratifica-
tion period, the Court becomes competent to hear the case with respect to the obligation to investigate.
14 Kholodovy v. Russia, Application no. 30651/05, decision of 14 September 2006.
15 Blečić v. Croatia, Application no. 59532/00, Judgement of 8 March 2006, ECHR 2006-III, para. 77.
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ity but a judgment rendered on the merits. Moreover, the case was decided by the most 
important judicial formation of the Court, reserved for the most important and difficult 
cases, i.e. the Grand Chamber composed of a group of 17 judges. Although not a right 
to life case, the Blečić judgment had to be treated as an important precedent. 
Following these developments it became all the more reasonable to shift the gist of 
the “Katyń complaint” towards an ECHR provision other than Article 2 protecting 
the right to life. Our choice went to Article 8, on the right to private and family life. 
First, it could be argued that the close relatives of the killed (disappeared) persons were 
entitled to know the circumstances of their deaths and the burial places. Accordingly, 
the relatives must be given access to the legal proceedings on the killing(s) as well as to 
the results thereof. Such knowledge was also needed for the success of the rehabilitation 
procedure instituted in Russia (‘good name’ being one of the facets of private life under 
Article 8). Second, the Strasbourg Court seemed willing to broadly use Article 8 enti-
tlements in different factual contexts. Third, an important hint could be drawn from 
the Moldovan/Rostaş decision. While dismissing the allegations raised under Article 2 
as temporally inadmissible, the Court had given the applicants satisfaction in a subse-
quent judgment, finding that there were violations of Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR.16 
This illustrated that the Court was open to providing some redress to the victims.
In 2007, when the first legal steps taken by the applicants were underway in Russia, 
the Court delivered, as a chamber, its judgment in Šilih v. Slovenia.17 The case con-
cerned the lack of an efficient investigation into death of the applicants’ son, who had 
died due to alleged medical malpractice. The fatal event happened prior to the ratifica-
tion of the ECHR by Slovenia. In a unanimous judgment the Court first declared the 
application admissible under Article 2 of the ECHR, and then found a violation of the 
procedural obligation inherent in Article 2 (the procedural limb). In this judgment the 
Court returned to its position from the Bălăşoiu decision, and it repeated that approach 
several months later in Teren Aksakal v. Turkey.18 
As the Court’s case law was conflicting at that point, in order to solve the matter the 
Court had to set a clear standard, convening as the Grand Chamber.19 This took place 
on 9 April 2009 in Šilih v. Slovenia, reheard by 17 judges following a request lodged 
by the government. Happily for us, this judgment closely coincided with our receipt 
16 Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), Application nos. 41138/98 and 64320/98, Judgement of 
12 July 2005, ECHR 2005-VII. The violations resulted from the deplorable living conditions of the ap-
plicants after they had left their destroyed houses.
17 Šilih v. Slovenia, Application no. 71463/01, Judgement of 28 June 2005. Making use of new proce-
dural opportunities, the Court did not render a separate decision on admissibility but decided to examine 
the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility.
18 Teren Aksakal v. Turkey, Application no. 51967/99, Judgement of 11 September 2007. The chamber 
vote was 5 to 2. 
19 The two dissenting judges in the Teren Aksakal case remarked on the Court’s conflicting case law 
and called on the Court to set the standard in a Grand Chamber judgment. It is worth noting that already 
in that case the chamber intended to relinquish its jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, but the 
Turkish government objected to the motion.
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of final decisions in our Russian cases (the two sets of proceedings were finished on 25 
November 2008 and 29 January 2009). 
In the Šilih judgment the Court, aware of the precedential character of its ruling, 
pointed out some general principles applicable when the issue of the temporal reach of 
the ECHR is raised under Article 2 (paras. 161-163). Having regard to the principle of 
legal certainty, the temporal jurisdiction of the Court must not be open-ended. It also 
made clear that the Court could only deal with procedural acts and omissions which 
occurred after the critical date of ratification. Then the Court proceeded to the most 
important part of the principles enunciated in the judgment. It held that the Court 
would be competent to adjudicate on the efficacy of a national investigation if there 
exists “a genuine connection” between the death and the entry into force of the ECHR 
for a particular state. This genuine connection is deemed to exist when “a significant 
proportion” of procedural steps have been or ought to have been carried out after the 
ratification date (this can be called “the proportion rule”). But the Court also added 
that it would not exclude that “in certain circumstances” the required connection could 
be based “on the need to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the 
ECHR are protected in a real and effective manner” (later called by the Court “the 
humanitarian rule” or “the Convention values rule”). 
The judgment of the Grand Chamber was rendered by a huge majority of 15 votes 
to two. It formulates an original judicial vision of the test (or rather several tests) to be 
used for answering the question whether the Court has temporal jurisdiction to verify the 
quality of a domestic investigation when the triggering act (in this case death, but also acts 
contrary to Article 3) occurred in the pre-ratification period. At the same time, the pro-
posal of the Court is complex. While I accept the final conclusion confirming the Court’s 
temporal competence, I fully share some criticisms of the judgment. The Šilih case could 
(and should) have been decided in a simpler and clearer way by adhering to the existing 
international case law on temporal jurisdiction, above all that elaborated by the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice and International Court of Justice.20 Instead, we were 
offered an unclear road-map with a plenty of confusing signs.21 This uncomfortable situa-
tion was made even worse by several concurrent opinions appended to the judgment. 
3. lodging the “Katyń Complaint” at strasbourg
The “Katyń complaint”, which was lodged with the Court as a preliminary applica-
tion in May and as a final one in August 2009,22 made use of the Šilih narrative. But 
20 See E. Bjorge, Right for the Wrong Reasons: Silih v. Slovenia and Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis in the 
European Court of Human Rights, 83 British Yearbook of International Law 115 (2012).
21 See e.g. UK Supreme Court’s judgment of 18 May 2011, In the matter of an application by Brigid 
McCaughey and another for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland)) [2011] UKSC 20. Justice Lord Phillips 
called the “genuine connection” factor not an easy one and the referral to the Convention values Delphic.
22 Wołk-Jezierska and Others v. Russia, Application no. 29520/09, which later became the case of Jano-
wiec and Others v. Russia, Applications nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09. 
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first of all I referred to the need for protecting the fundamental Convention values as 
the justification for the Court’s competence to hear the allegations under Article 2, the 
right to life. If, as the Court specified in its case law on hate speech, expressions denying 
the reality of crimes against humanity and war crimes contravened the core values of the 
ECHR,23 all the more the same rationale should apply to such crimes themselves. I also 
pointed out the drafting history of the ECHR, which clearly specified that the treaty 
was a reaction to the atrocities committed by the totalitarian regimes during WWII.
I also drew the Court’s attention to the fact that the Katyń massacre constituted 
a crime under international law, not subject to a statute of limitations. At the same 
time I also submitted that, alternatively, the Court could adjudicate by relying on “the 
rule of proportion of procedural steps”. Some new important activity must have taken 
place after 5 May 1998 if the Russian authorities had so radically departed from the 
established historical facts (the murder of Polish citizens) and had accepted the “disap-
pearance version” as their final one.
The applicants also complained that the Russian Federation had violated Article 3, 
which prohibits degrading and inhuman treatment (by, inter alia, denial of the crime 
and providing contradictory information on the fate of the applicants’ relatives, and 
suggesting that there may have existed due reasons for the execution, if “hypothetically” 
conducted, in 1940). Additionally, I did not resign from relying on Article 8 (right to 
private and family life) as a Convention ground for the applicants’ entitlement of access 
to the Russian Katyń investigation. 
In November 2009, the application was granted priority status24 and the case was 
communicated to the Russian government for comments. In January 2010 the Polish 
government decided to join the case as a third party. 
In principle, the proceedings before the Court are in written form, with an oral hear-
ing before a chamber reserved only for the most difficult cases. In its submissions, the 
Russian government never called Katyń a massacre or a crime, but consistently referred 
to it as the “Katyń events”. It insisted that neither under national legislation nor inter-
national law did there exist any obligation to conduct the Katyń investigation which, 
actually, was only started as a political “goodwill gesture” to the Polish side. Moreover, 
Russia refused to provide the Court with a copy of the decision to discontinue Katyń 
investigation no. 159 (requested by the Court in the application communication docu-
ment), alleging in could not do so for reasons of its core national security.
In July 2011 the Court declared the application admissible as to the claim under 
Article 3 (degrading and inhuman treatment). It further decided to join the issue of 
the applicability of Article 2 (right to life in its procedural aspect) with the analysis on 
the merits. Additionally, in August the Court asked the parties whether Russia, by not 
producing a copy of the decision the Court had asked for, had failed to comply with its 
obligation to cooperate under Article 38. 
23 Garaudy v. France, Application no. 65831/01, decision of 24 June 2003, ECHR 2003-IX.
24 This status was important, as there were almost 150,000 cases awaiting examination by the Court.
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The Court decided to hold an oral hearing on 6 October 2011 in Strasbourg. From 
the questions prepared for the hearing it clearly transpired that the Court was ready for 
the first time to make use of the clause of the core values of the Convention as a jus-
tification for its competence to examine allegations concerning the lack of an efficient 
investigation. The parties were asked whether “the mass murder of Polish prisoners can 
be characterised as a war crime?”25
The chamber that examined the case was composed of the following judges: Dean 
Spielmann (President, Luxembourg), Karel Jungwiert (Czech Republic), Boštjan M. 
Zupančič (Slovenia), Anatoly Kovler (Russia), Mark Villiger (Swiss representing Liech-
tenstein), Ganna Yudkivska (Ukraine) and Angelika Nußberger (Germany).
4. Chamber judgment
The Court’s judgement was delivered on 16 April 2012 at a public hearing in Stras-
bourg.26 Russia was found guilty of violations of Article 3 (by its treatment of the 
applicants not only in a degrading way, but also a severely inhuman way) and Article 
38 (lack of due cooperation with the Court). In giving the reasons for its finding of 
a violation of Article 3 (declared by a vote of 5 to 2; the Russian and Czech judges 
dissenting), the Court stated that it was “struck by the apparent reluctance of the Rus-
sian authorities to recognize the reality of the Katyń massacre, to which the applicants’ 
relatives had fallen victim”; that “the approach chosen by the Russian military courts 
which consisted in maintaining, to the applicants’ face and contrary to the established 
historic facts, that the applicants’ relatives had somehow vanished in the Soviet camps, 
demonstrated a callous disregard for the applicants’ concerns and deliberate obfusca-
tion of the circumstances of the Katyń massacre” (para. 159); that “a denial of the real-
ity of the mass murder reinforced by the implied proposition that Polish prisoners may 
have had a criminal charge to answer and had been duly sentenced to capital punish-
ment demonstrated the attitude vis-à-vis the applicants that was not just opprobrious 
but also lacking in humanity” (para. 160); that “the Russian authorities did not pro-
vide the applicants with any official information about the circumstances surrounding 
the death of their relatives or make any earnest attempts to locate their burial sites” 
(para. 164); and that “by acknowledging that the applicants’ relatives had been held 
prisoners in the Soviet camps but declaring that their subsequent fate could not be 
elucidated, the Russian courts denied the reality of summary executions that had been 
carried out in the Katyń forest and at other mass murder sites. The Court considers that 
such approach chosen by the Russian authorities has been contrary to the fundamental 
values of the Convention and must have exacerbated the applicants’ suffering” (para. 
165). The Court referred also to the corresponding case law of the UN Human Rights 
25 Answers to the questions submitted on behalf of the applicants were published in XXXI Polish 
Yearbook of International Law 409 (2011).
26 This is a rare practice, as the Court’s judgments are usually sent by mail to the parties and posted on 
the Court’s website.
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Committee.27 At the same time, the Court made a certain unconvincing distinction 
among the applicants (paras. 153-154). It considered that those born “after the precipi-
tated departure of their fathers to war had never had a personal contact with them”, and 
thus could not be regarded as victims in the context of Article 3.
By a vote of 4 to 3 the Court also held28 that the Russian Federation’s government 
had breached its obligation of co-operation with the Court under Article 38 on account 
of its failure to submit a copy of the decision to discontinue Russian investigation into 
the Katyń massacre. At no point in the proceedings did Russia explain the exact na-
ture of its current core security concerns that required classification of the document 
regarding the mass scale murder committed by the totalitarian Soviet regime. Moreo-
ver, in 2010 it turned out that the identity of the authority which had made the deci-
sion, in 2004, to classify the document was far from clear. When Memorial, a Russian 
human-rights non-governmental organization, instituted domestic proceedings to de-
classify the decision to close the Katyń investigation, the Interagency Commission for 
the Protection of State Secrets, which had allegedly – according to government state-
ments – approved the classified status, informed the Moscow City Court that it had 
actually made no classification decision. This meant that both the Polish side and the 
Strasbourg Court had been given untrue information by the Russian government. The 
Court added that it was not convinced that a public and transparent investigation into 
the crimes of the previous totalitarian regime could have compromised the national 
security interests of the contemporary democratic Russian Federation. Moreover, the 
classification decision appears to have been at variance even with the relevant Russian 
legislation, that expressly precludes any information about violations of human rights 
by State officials from being classified (section 7 of the State Secret Act of 21 July 1993). 
The Court concluded that no substantive grounds could have justified the refusal to 
produce a copy of the requested decision (para. 109).29 It is also worth stressing that for 
27 UN Human Rights Committee, Mariam Sankara et al. v. Burkina Faso, no. 1159/2003, views of 
28 March 2006.
28 The Russian, Czech and Slovenian judges dissented. They voted for non-violation of Article 38, 
based on the fact that the Court declared itself not competent to adjudicate on the allegations concerning 
Article 2 (see below). As a copy of the decision to discontinue the Russian Katyń investigation was needed 
in the framework of allegations raised under Article 2, finding these allegations inadmissible ratione tem-
poris should have automatically led to no violation of the State’s obligation to co-operate with the Court. 
In other words, the dissenting judges treated the procedural co-operation obligation as corollary to (and 
conditional upon) the Court having jurisdiction to hear any substantive claims under the Convention. On 
the other hand, the position taken in the judgment treated the obligation to co-operate as absolute and 
independent on the final decision(s) as to the admissibility of allegations.
29 The Court also added that “even assuming that the Russian Government had legitimate security 
considerations for keeping secret the text of the requested decision, those could have been accommodated 
with appropriate procedural arrangements, including a restricted access to the document in question under 
Rule 33 of the Rules of Court and, in extremis, the holding of a hearing behind closed doors. Although the 
Russian Government was fully aware of those possibilities, they preferred not to make use of them or seek 
their application by the Court, which is an additional indication of their reluctance to comply with the 
Court’s request under Article 38 of the Convention” (para. 110).
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the first time the Court analysed the obligation to co-operate under Article 38 of the 
ECHR as read in the light of Article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for 
its failure to perform a treaty”).
On the other hand, by a narrow majority of 4 votes to 3 the Court ruled, with re-
spect to the claim under Article 2, that it was “unable to take cognisance of the merits 
of the complaint”. Although all the judges agreed that the Katyń massacre was, as a war 
crime, an imprescriptible crime under international law that contradicted the under-
lying Convention values, the majority held that this feature alone did not suffice to 
make the Court competent to verify if an effective investigation had been carried out 
domestically. 
The majority (judges from Russia, Ukraine, Slovenia and the Czech Republic) stated 
that a second element must additionally occur.30 Information casting new light on the 
crime’s circumstances must come into the public domain in the post-ratification period 
in order to “provide a bridge from the distant past into the recent post-ratification 
period” (para. 140). In the opinion of the Court’s majority, in the period after 5 May 
1998 no such piece of evidence had been produced or discovered. This new-piece-of-
evidence requirement was specified for the first time in the Katyń judgment; it did not 
exist in the previous case law of the Court identifying the pre-conditions of the Court’s 
jurisdiction ratione temporis.31 Had we been aware of such a requirement prior to the 
hearing we could have undertaken efforts to demonstrate that important new evidence 
had been transmitted to the Russian investigation after the ratification date (5 May 
1998). It is also puzzling how the majority could have ascertained that there was no 
new evidence surfacing after the critical date, since the substantive part of the Russian 
investigation no. 159 remained classified.
30 Actually, however, this approach was accepted by only two judges (Slovenian and Czech), as the 
Russian and Ukrainian judges adhered to another view (see their concurrent opinion attached to the judg-
ment). According to their (“realistic”) view, as several decades elapsed since the Katyń massacre, there were 
no prospects of success to conduct the investigation effectively. They also made a distinction between two 
types of investigations: the first one being instituted by “real legal causes”, the second one being conducted 
only due to political or moral motives (as “a political gesture”). In their view, the Convention standards on 
effective investigation applied only to the first category. These differences of opinions among the majority 
judges meant that the important standard set in the Katyń judgment (the new element test) was actually 
shared (and authored) only by two judges of the seven judges chamber.
31 Brecknell v. the United Kingdom (Application no. 32457/04, Judgement of 27 November 2007), 
on which the Court relied, is not a temporal jurisdiction case where the Convention-values test was to be 
applied, but an entirely post-ratification case raising the issue of what can renew the procedural obligation 
under Article 2 when the case was stalled for many years. Of some relevance for the Katyń case might be 
the inadmissibility decision in Çakir and Others v. Cyprus (Application no. 7864/06, decision of 29 April 
2010), rendered in a case where all the circumstances of a killing committed at the time of Cypriot conflict 
in 1975 were known from the very beginning, but there was no investigation thereafter. The Katyń case 
differed from the Cypriot one, however, because the circumstances of the Katyń massacre were not known 
and the Soviet Union denied its involvement, putting the blame on the German side. The Çakir decision 
was not referred to by the Court in the Katyń judgment. 
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The approach taken by the majority was criticised by the three-judge minority (Lux-
embourg, Liechtenstein and Germany). They wrote, in their joint dissenting opinion 
appended to the judgement, that the Court’s position resulted in narrowing the refer-
ence to the underlying Convention values. Due to the scale and magnitude of the 
Katyń massacre, coupled with the attitude of the Russian authorities after the entry into 
force of the Convention, the Court should have found the complaint under Article 2 
admissible and then should have decided that there was a violation of that provision. 
The three dissenting judges went on to stress that even if they had adopted the logic 
of the majority by introducing a second element (sufficiently important material cast-
ing new light on the crime and emerging in the post-ratification period), they would 
still be satisfied that the Court had jurisdiction to examine the complaint. The sudden 
swings in the Russian investigation (i.e. “murdered soldiers” turning into “disappeared 
ones”) should be interpreted as a new element relevant for the Court. 
The dissenting opinion starts with the statement that the case raises “important 
questions affecting the application of the Convention as well as serious issues of general 
importance in respect of Article 2 (procedural limb)” [underlined in the original]. This 
refers verbatim to the wording of Article 43(2) of the ECHR, that specifies when a case 
should be reheard by the Grand Chamber upon a request of a party to the dispute.
And here I add one more piece of information to make the picture of the judgment 
complete: we learned about the ruling four days before it was officially pronounced at 
a hearing at Strasbourg. On 12 April 2012, the Russian daily newspaper „Moskovskiye 
Novosti” published an article “We are not responsible for Stalin”. It gave details of the 
judgment (with some incorrect information as to the voting results) and heralded that 
the Poles, all in all, had lost the case. Following subsequent interventions of the Polish 
government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and myself at the Court, the President of 
the Court conducted an investigation into the leak (among others, it interviewed all 
the judges involved in the case, and a similar scrutiny took place at the Court Regis-
try). Although the investigation did not identify those responsible, we were informed 
that the Court had introduced new safeguards to prevent such leaks from occurring in 
the future. 
5. referral of the Case to the grand Chamber
A request for referring the Katyń case to the Grand Chamber was submitted in June 
2012.32 A panel of five judges granted the request on 24 September 2012.33 A public 
32 This request was supported by the Polish government, a third party to the proceedings.
33 Requests for a rehearing must not be confused with traditional domestic appeals motions. At 
Strasbourg, requests are allowed sporadically only when a panel a five judges has been convinced by the 
requesting party that a case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the 
Convention, or a serious issue of general importance. The text of the request is reproduced in XXXII Polish 
Yearbook of International Law 327 (2012).
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hearing was scheduled for 13 February 2013. The parties were invited to state their final 
legal positions, and again, prior to the hearing, they were sent questions to be answered. 
The questions, while generally similar to those posed earlier by the chamber, contained 
three novelties. First, the parties were asked if the Court had jurisdiction to assess the 
respondent State’s compliance with the procedural obligations arising out of Article 2 
of the ECHR relating to an investigation into deaths that occurred before the entry into 
force of the Convention on 3 September 1953. From this question it clearly transpired 
that the Court intended to consider whether there is a difference, in legal terms, be-
tween situations in which the triggering act (death) occurred before, and those in which 
such act occurred after the date on which the European Convention came into legal 
force.34 Second, the Court asked the opinion of the parties on whether a procedural 
obligation under Article 2 of the Convention can be said to have arisen by reason of 
any events which took place in the post-ratification period. Third, the Court inquired if 
the proximity of family ties can be a factor justifying a distinction between two groups 
of applicants, as was done in the chamber judgment. 
In addressing the question whether the Court had jurisdiction to assess the compli-
ance of Russia with its procedural obligations under Article 2, inasmuch as the Katyń 
massacre predated the entry into force of the Convention, I broadly referred to the case 
law of several international courts and bodies which was relevant in the context of deter-
mining whether competence ratione temporis exists to adjudicate temporally “stretched” 
cases. The Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of 
Justice made the distinction between situations or facts which constitute a source of 
the rights claimed by a party to a proceeding, and those being a source of the dispute.35 
Whereas the source of the dispute must relate to situations or facts subsequent to the 
ratification, the source situation giving rise to the rights of a party to the dispute may 
originate in the pre-ratification period.36 Applying this reasoning to the “Katyń case”, 
I argued that the dispute was not about the killings that occurred before the critical 
date of the Convention’s ratification by Russia, but about Russia’s subsequent failure to 
effectively investigate the 1940 massacre. The killings constitute the source of the right 
claimed by the applicants, i.e. the right to have the killings investigated by the State in 
a proper and effective manner. Had it not been for the killings, the procedural obliga-
tion to investigate would not have arisen. Only in this sense is the dispute related to 
34 After the Grand Chamber’s Šilih judgment, the Court delivered 21 judgments concerning inves-
tigations into deaths that predated the ratification date of the Convention. In all these cases the Court, 
adjudicating as a chamber, has unanimously found itself to be temporarily competent, and thereby strongly 
confirmed the position taken in Šilih. The Katyń complaint was the first case before the Court in which the 
deaths as a triggering event took place prior to the Convention’s coming into legal force. 
35 Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v. Bulgaria), Judgment of 4 April 1939, PCIJ Rep. 
Series A/B No. 77, para. 87; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State: Germany v. Italy, order of 20 July 2010.
36 Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment of 14 June 1938, Series A/B no. 74, p. 24; Right of Passage over Indian 
Territory, Portugal v. India, Judgment of 12 April 1960, ICJ Reports 1960. p. 33/35); Electricity Company 
of Sofia and Bulgaria, para. 87, and a summary of the PCIJ case law in Certain Property, Liechtenstein v. 
Germany [preliminary objections, judgment], Judgment of 10 February 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, para. 41.
THE KATYŃ MASSACRE... 217
the pre-accession facts. But the source of the actual dispute, i.e. the non-fulfilment of 
the procedural obligation, is located squarely in the post-ratification period. What is 
also important is that the obligation to investigate (to establish the circumstances sur-
rounding the killings and to draw the required consequences therefrom) was not a legal 
novelty introduced upon the entry of the Convention into legal force, but resulted from 
universally binding international law in effect at the time the massacre had occurred. As 
is clearly evidenced by the post-war trials, international law, as it existed in 1939, made 
not only States but also individuals responsible for war crimes.37
This procedural obligation under Article 2 is not made conditional upon the pos-
sibility of bringing the alleged suspects to criminal responsibility. The parameters 
of effective investigations are much broader and they encompass, among other ob-
ligations, an obligation to determine and reveal the circumstances of tragic events. 
The obligation to hold an effective investigation has been especially stressed in the 
case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has been confronted 
with numerous cases involving massacres committed by state agents.38 The right to 
truth is of particular and preponderant importance in cases of gross human rights 
violations.39 
The attention of the Court was also drawn to the practice of two human rights bod-
ies: the Inter-American Court on Human Rights and the United Nations Committee 
on Human Rights. The Inter-American Court found itself competent to adjudicate on 
the obligation to investigate even when the killings occurred before the Inter-American 
37 The International Military Tribunal stated in its main judgment (Goering and Others Trial) “[that] 
international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States has long been rec-
ognized.” It then continued: “[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provision of international 
law be enforced” (Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg: 
1947, vol. I, p. 223). See also e.g. High Command Trial (Case of Wilhelm von Leeb and Thirteen Others), Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XII, pp. 60-61. The principle of individual criminal responsibility 
for war crimes is a long-standing rule of customary international law, already recognized in the Lieber Code 
of 24 April 1863 (art. 44 and 47) and the Oxford Manual of 9 September 1880 (art. 48), and repeated in 
many treaties of international humanitarian law since.
38 In Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Judgment of 29 July 1988), the Court held that “even in the hy-
pothetical case that those individually responsible for crimes of this type cannot be legally punished under 
certain circumstances, the State is obligated to use the means at its disposal to inform the relatives of the 
fate of the victims and, if they have been killed, the location of their remains” (para. 181).
39 The UN Human Rights Council, in Resolutions 9/11 and 12/12: Right to the Truth (of 24 Sep-
tember 2008 and 12 October 2009 respectively) referred to “the right of the victims of gross violations 
of human rights and the right of their relatives to the truth about the events that have taken place, 
including the identification of the perpetrators of the facts that gave rise to such violations”. In the same 
vein, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated, in Gomes Lund and Others (“Guerrilha Do 
Araguaia”) v. Brazil [preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs], Judgment of 24 November 
2010, while summarising the position of this Court, that “all persons, including the next of kin of the 
victims of gross human rights violations, have the right to know the truth. As a consequence, the next 
of kin of the victims and society must be informed of all that occurred in regard to said violations” 
(para. 201).
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Convention on Human Rights entered into legal force.40 Even more interesting is a case 
from the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, which concerned an enforced 
disappearance in 1974. The applicant (mother of the disappeared person) relied on the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which entered into force in 1976. 
The Committee found the communication inadmissible ratione temporis, having regard 
to a declaration the Chilean government made upon the ratification of the Covenant. 
The declaration stipulated that the Committee would be competent to consider com-
munications only with respect to acts which began after 11 March 1990.41 The Com-
mittee’s acceptance of this declaration demonstrates that there exists a legal instrument 
for States wishing to limit, in temporal terms, the application of a given treaty. The 
Russian Federation did not make an analogous declaration or reservation when ratify-
ing the European Convention.42
With respect to the Grand Chamber’s question whether there were any events in 
the post-ratification period that might have given rise to a procedural obligation under 
Article 2, the Court’s attention was drawn to the so-called “Ukrainian list”, recognised 
by historians as containing the names of 3,435 prisoners held in the prisons of Western 
Ukraine and executed in 1940 in the Ukrainian part of the Katyń massacre.43 As late 
as 2002 the Ukrainian authorities handed over to the Russian side numerous pieces of 
evidence, the most important of which was a copy of the Ukrainian list discovered in 
the archives in Ukraine. Some documents contain data indicating that there might have 
been unknown execution and burial sites. This ample material was included into the 
case file of the Russian investigation as late as 2 August 2004, hence only forty days be-
fore the investigation was discontinued. The Ukrainian dossier should be considered as 
a fresh and important new evidentiary material coming in the post-ratification period.
It was lastly submitted that the test applied by the chamber to establish if a given ap-
plicant could be considered a victim (which resulted in dividing the applicants into two 
40 Gomes Lund and Others (“Guerrilha Do Araguaia”) v. Brazil, paras. 16-18. See also Almonacid-Arellano 
and Others v. Chile [preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs], Judgment of 26 September 
2006, paras. 46-50. In the same vein, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation has dismissed 
ratione temporis objections based on allegations that the treaty in question was applied retroactively due 
to the fact the contested measures had preceded the date that the treaty entered into legal force. See: 
Banana (III) case (European Communities − Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas) 
WT/DS27/AB/R; report of 9 September 1997, paras. 235-237; Canada – Term of Patent Protection, WT/
DS170/AB/R; report of 18 September 2000, paras. 70-72.
41 Norma Yurich v. Chile, no. 1078/2002, 2 November 2005, UN Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1078/2002 
(2005).
42 It must be assumed that, unless otherwise expressly stated in the treaty, its provisions apply to situa-
tions that do not cease to exist after the treaty’s entry into force. Thus a State-party wishing to exclude the 
application of the treaty to such situations must do so by means of an express reservation. This position 
is mirrored in the case law of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court 
of Justice (Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Phosphates in Morocco, Case Concerning Application of the 
Genocide Convention).
43 The “Ukrainian list” contains the names of persons whose personal files were forwarded on 24 Novem-
ber 1940 by the Ukrainian NKVD to the Soviet NKVD after the execution actions were completed. 
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distinct groups) is too narrow, as it is limited only to one factor, i.e. family relationship. 
It does not take into account other circumstances relevant for determining whether an 
applicant may be treated, in the particular circumstances of a case under consideration, 
as a victim under Article 3. Instead of the simple one-factor test a more adequate, con-
textually sensitive and inclusive test should be used by the Court. Moreover, although 
any feasible test must be based on a family relationship/bond, it should also refer to the 
behaviour of the applicant. In other words, if personal involvement of a (more distant) 
relative demonstrates that he/she is attached to the killed/disappeared person, such 
a relative should be afforded victim status under Article 3. This approach was illustrated 
by the practice of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights.44 
In December 2012 the Court allowed six non-governmental organisations to join 
the case. They all presented amicus curiae briefs that supported, in one way or anoth-
er, the applicants’ claims. These organisations were: Amnesty International (London), 
Open Society Justice Initiative (New York), Public International Law & Policy Group 
(The Hague), and acting jointly the Human Rights Centre “Memorial” (Moscow), 
European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (London) and Essex Transitional Justice 
Network, School of Law, University of Essex, UK.45
In its final written submissions, sent to the Court shortly before the Grand Cham-
ber hearing, the Russian government claimed that the ruling taken by the Russian Chief 
Military Prosecutor’s Office on 2 August 2004, by which the documents received from 
Ukraine had been included in the file of Katyń investigation, was “a procedural mis-
take”. It stated that the ruling “contains a manifestly unsubstantiated conclusion about 
the fact that those documents concerned the execution of 3,435 Polish citizens in the 
spring of 1940 in the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic” (para. 5). The 
Russian government argued further that the so-called Ukrainian list, forwarded by the 
Ukrainian authorities to the Russian Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office in 2002, was 
not a list of executed persons or a prisoners’ dispatch list. By its submissions the Russian 
government made an attempt, at the very last moment, to undermine the argument 
that the Ukrainian documentation should to be treated as an important new element 
emerging in the post-ratification period, giving the Court temporal competence over 
the Katyń case (if the ‘new element test’ used by the chamber was to be applied).46
At the hearing held on 13 February 2013, the parties recapitulated their legal positions 
as expressed in their written submissions. The Polish government made a comprehensive 
analysis of the Ukrainian material, demonstrating its pertinent role to Katyń investiga-
tion. No questions were asked by the Grand Chamber after the parties’ statements. 
The Grand Chamber was chaired by Josep Casadevall, Vice-president of the Court 
and judge elected in respect of Andorra. Usually the Grand Chamber cases are headed 
by President of the Court. On 1 November 2012 this post was taken by Dean Spiel-
44 Gomes Lund and Others (“Guerrilha Do Araguaia”) v. Brazil, para. 235-238.
45 These amicus curiae briefs are reproduced in XXXII Polish Yearbook of International Law 334 (2012).
46 It is puzzling which Russian authority, and on what legal grounds, “excluded” or “disqualified” the 
material in question from the file when the case had already been closed.
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mann. Inasmuch as he headed the chamber’s Katyń case (and co-authored the dissent-
ing opinion to the chamber’s ruling under Article 2), he preferred to withdraw from 
sitting in the case pending before the Grand Chamber, even though under the proce-
dural rules of the Court he was not obliged to do so.47
6. the grand Chamber judgment
When the Grand Chamber pronounced its Katyń judgment on 21 October 2013, 
the words most often heard in the Court building at Strasbourg were “unbelievable” and 
“incredible”. The ruling, initiated at the request of the applicants, turned out to be worse 
for them than the previous chamber judgment. The Grand Chamber concluded that: 
• Russia had not duly co-operated with the Court and accordingly violated Article 
38 (unanimous ruling);
• the Court was not competent ratione temporis to examine, under Article 2, whether 
the Russian investigation into the Katyń massacre was effective (13 votes to four);
• there was no violation of Article 3’s prohibition of inhuman and degrading treat-
ment (12 votes to five).
I consider the Grand Chamber’s Katyń judgment as one of the worst rulings of the 
Court. My highly critical assessment is based on two reasons. One is related to what is 
missing in the judgment; the other touches upon what was said in the ruling. 
In each judgment the Court, before giving its opinion on particular allegations 
raised in the application, first makes a summary of the parties’ submissions and then 
addresses them. That is the basic precept of the requirement to hear the case fairly. 
Nevertheless, in the Katyń judgment the Grand Chamber did not answer the applicants 
arguments submitted under Article 2, nor were these arguments recapitulated by the 
Court. Readers of the judgment are not aware that the applicants broadly referred to 
the international case law on temporal jurisdiction from such bodies and courts as 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, the International Court of Justice, the 
Inter-American Court on Human Rights, the United Nations Committee on Human 
Rights, and others. No mention is made of the crucial distinction between the source 
of right and the source of the dispute, as applied in international judicial practice. No 
information can be found on the fact that there is a mechanism for legal reservations 
available to states wishing to limit the temporal application of a given treaty. On the 
other hand, the Grand Chamber summarizes the applicants’ arguments in an accurate 
and adequate manner and with no omissions when they suit the conclusion reached in 
the judgment that Russian Federation violated Article 38 (referring to the international 
47 Under Rules of the Court, all judges who rendered a chamber judgment subsequently referred to 
the Grand Chamber are excluded from the Grand Chamber rehearing of the case with the exception of the 
chamber’s president and a judge elected in respect of the state concerned (Rule 24). Before the chamber the 
Russia was represented by Anatoly Kovler. His term in office terminated on 31 October 2012, and from 1 
November 2012 the new Russian judge is Dmitry Dedov.
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case law broadly identified by the applicants in the context of the state’s obligation to 
co-operate and relevant to Article 38).
The omissions in the judgment leave me – I’m trying to use elegant language here – 
deeply perplexed. Careful readers of Strasbourg judgments may have already earlier come 
across some instances of such a worrying practice on the part of the Court. I cite here 
only one example: in a partly dissenting opinion to the Grand Chamber judgment in 
Kafkaris v. Cyprus judge Javier Borrego Borrego specifies those facts pertinent to the case 
that were mislaid in or vanished from that part of the ruling that provided an account 
of the factual background of the case.48 Following my personal and very disappointing 
experience in the Katyń case I have become more inclined to concede, with great regret, 
that omissions and misrepresentations occur at Strasbourg even in the most important 
cases decided by the Grand Chamber. This practice is possible because the Court does 
not make public, as other international courts do, the submissions of the parties. I am 
strongly convinced that the time has come for the Court to post the parties submissions 
on the Court’s website, along with the decisions made by the Court in particular cases.
I am also unable to accept the reasoning the Grand Chamber applied in finding that 
it lacked competence to hear the Katyń case on the merits under Article 2. The Janowiec 
case was used by the Court to clarify, as it expressly admitted, its case law with respect 
to the Šilih criteria (paras. 140 and subseq.). Nevertheless, I have serious doubts if this 
was done in a convincing manner, for the following reasons:
First, the Grand Chamber confirms the ‘new element test’ (discovery of new and 
sufficiently important material after the critical date of ratification as triggering a fresh 
procedural obligation under Article 2), but does not give it an independent status. The 
application of this test is made conditional upon positively passing through either the 
“genuine connection” test or the “Convention values” test (para. 144 in fine). This ap-
proach has huge consequences. In its Katyń judgment, the chamber posed the question 
of the Court’s temporal jurisdiction in the following way: did any unknown and suf-
ficiently important material emerge after the ratification date that might cast new light 
on the case? If the answer is positive, the Court becomes competent ratione temporis. 
The Grand Chamber’s position was different. The ‘new element test’ is not an inde-
pendent tool and as such cannot open the door to the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Second, in the Šilih judgment the Court pointed out that there must exist a ‘genuine 
connection’ between the triggering event (death) and the entry into force of the Con-
vention in respect of a given state. This connection was understood as requiring that 
much of the investigation into the death took place, or ought to have taken place, in the 
period following the ratification (the proportion rule). The Grand Chamber in its Katyń 
judgment introduces into the content of the genuine connection requirement a new 
time factor of specified duration. In the Šilih judgment the Court merely stated that its 
temporal jurisdiction must not be open-ended. I find this approach justified because 
it allows for taking into account the differing and specific circumstances of particular 
48 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, Application no. 21906/04, Judgement of 12 February 2008. 
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cases. The first and foremost element of this approach is how much of the investigation 
was carried out after the critical date. In its Katyń ruling, the Grand Chamber departed 
from this assumption. The time factor becomes “the first and most crucial indicator 
of the ‘genuine’ nature of the connection”. And the duration of that time-span must 
remain “reasonably short” and should not exceed ten years (para. 146). Why not five 
years or twenty years? Because ten is the first two-digit number? Although the Court 
refers to its previous case law, in which the relevant ratification date and the death date 
was separated by more or less ten years, I consider this “factual justification” to be un-
convincing.49 Already in Mladenović v. Serbia the time span was 13 years.50 Must the 
applicant in that case consider herself lucky that her judgment preceded by one year 
the Grand Chamber’s ruling in the Katyń case, or is the decreed time-span to be treated 
flexibly? Neither explanation offers consolation to the applicants. 
The insertion of the definite time factor corresponds with the view expressed by judge 
Peer Lorenzen in a concurrent opinion appended to the Šilih judgment. His individual 
view, not joined by any other Grand Chamber judge in Šilih, seems to have eventually 
attained the status of the Court’s standard in the Grand Chamber’s Katyń judgment.
Third, the Grand Chamber confirms that the reference to the underlying Conven-
tion values in Šilih (Convention values test) means that the required connection for the 
Court’s jurisdiction may be found to exist if the triggering event is of a larger dimension 
than an ordinary criminal offence, and amounts to the negation of the very foundations 
of the Convention. This is the case with respect to serious crimes under international 
law, such as war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity, in accordance with the 
definitions given to them in the relevant international instruments (para. 150). The 
Court has stated that the heinous nature and gravity of such crimes prompted the 
contracting parties to the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limita-
tions to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity to agree that such crimes must 
be imprescriptible and not subject to any statute of limitations in the domestic legal 
order (para. 151). But now a dramatic change suddenly appears in the reasoning of the 
Court. The Grand Chamber considers that the Convention values clause cannot be 
applied to events which occurred prior to 4 November 1950, i.e. the adoption of the 
Convention.51 As a result, a state party cannot be held responsible under the Conven-
tion for its failure to investigate even the most serious crimes under international law if 
such criminal actions predated the Convention.
According to the Grand Chamber, inasmuch as the Katyń massacre was committed 
in 1940, Article 2 of the Convention cannot be applied to the Russian investigation, 
49 One may argue that had the Court in its previous case law allowed a longer (e.g. twenty years) or 
a shorter period (e.g. five years), it would have been likely for the Court to adhere to such a time span, 
according to the position taken by the Grand Chamber in Katyń.
50 Mladenović v. Serbia, Application no. 1099/08, Judgement of 22 May 2012.
51 This date is termed the beginning of the Convention’s “existence as an international human rights 
treaty”. In a cursory remark, I wish only to recall that an international treaty begins to exist in the legal sense 
of the word when it enters into force. In the case of the Convention this date was 4 November 1953.
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neither under the genuine connection test (more than ten years separates the date of the 
crime and Russia’s ratification of the Convention in 1998), nor when the Convention 
values test is evoked (the massacre predates the enactment of the Convention). Having 
ascertained the existence of these two critical circumstances, which according to the 
Court rendered it not competent ratione temporis, one might expect that the Court 
would finish its analysis at this point.52 But to the reader’s surprise, the Grand Chamber 
additionally indulges in verification whether any new important material came to light 
after the ratification date, causing the case to fall “within the scope of ‘procedural acts 
and omissions’ for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention” (para. 158). The Court 
concludes that it is not possible to identify any real investigative steps taken after 5 
May 1998, nor did any new relevant piece of evidence or substantive information come 
to light in the period after the critical date. At the same time, the re-evaluation of the 
evidence, the departure from previous findings, and the decision regarding the classifi-
cation of the investigation materials are held not to have amounted to the “significant 
proportion of the procedural steps” which is required for establishing a genuine connec-
tion for the purposes of Article 2 of the ECHR (para. 159). 
I do not share the Court’s conclusion as to the lack of any new important material 
emerging in the post-ratification period (the Ukrainian list and the accompanying dos-
sier). But above all, I cannot grasp the logic that might justify the Grand Chamber’s 
decision to make the analysis whether there were significant novelties in the course of 
investigation no. 159 after the critical date. The status of the ‘new material test’ remains 
uncertain to me. Does this test exist as separate and independent from the genuine 
connection test (now based on the ‘ten years rule’) and the Convention values test? 
Elementary logic answers that this is not possible, yet the reasoning of the Court dem-
onstrates the opposite. Those who are to apply the Convention standards domestically 
(and perhaps at Strasbourg too) are left confused. 
There is another problem with the coherence of the Grand Chamber’s reasoning. 
Imagine that Russia (the Soviet Union) ratified the Convention in 1950. Then the 
Court would have had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the fulfilment of its procedural ob-
ligations because the Katyń massacre was perpetrated only 10 years earlier, hence within 
the time limits needed to satisfy the genuine connection requirement. But the Court’s 
jurisdiction could not have been founded on the Convention values test as it applies 
only when the killings in question took place after 3 September 1950. Which compo-
nent is stronger and matters more: Convention values or the ten year rule? In the Grand 
Chamber’s answer it is not the fundamental and underlying axiology of the Convention 
values, but the simple arithmetical counting of years. But perhaps the Court simply 
forgot in its judgment to provide information that the ten-year rule does not extend 
beyond 3 September 1950, and it will correct the omission on a future occasion. 
52 The Court expressly stated that “if the triggering event lies outside the Court’s jurisdiction ratione 
temporis, the discovery of new material after the critical date may give rise to a fresh obligation to investi-
gate only if either the ‘genuine connection’ test or the ‘Convention values’ test has been met” (para. 144 
in fine).
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Fourth, referring to the notion of “procedural acts”, the Court made a distinction be-
tween, on the one hand, acts undertaken in the framework of criminal, civil, administrative 
or disciplinary proceedings which are capable of leading to the identification and punish-
ment of those responsible or to an award of compensation to the injured party, and on the 
other hand, other types of inquiries that may be carried out for other purposes, such as 
establishing a historical truth (para. 143). The procedural obligations under Article 2 only 
apply to the first type of proceedings. This distinction is artificial and unfortunate. Only 
upon the conclusion of some cases dealing with historical events will it be possible to as-
certain if there are people who should be accused or victims’ interests to protect. Moreover, 
even accepting this distinction, I see no reasons why the Article 2 procedural obligations 
should be so sharply differentiated with regard to the two types of proceedings.
My criticisms with respect to the Court’s finding under Article 2 are mostly of a legal 
and logical character. A different kind of criticism relates to the conclusion under Article 
3. As already mentioned above, the chamber stated in its Katyń judgment that it was 
struck by a number of individual specific, quoted, or described reactions and statements 
of the Russian authorities, which it considered tantamount to a denial of the reality of the 
Katyń massacre, running against the underlying values of the Convention and eventually 
qualified as acts not only of a degrading nature but also inhuman treatment. On the other 
hand, the Grand Chamber limits its reasoning to a couple of statements. The applicants 
knew their close relatives had been murdered, hence there was no uncertainty as to their 
fate (differently than in disappearance cases). The pronouncements of the Russian courts 
that withheld acknowledgment of the fact that the applicants’ relatives had been killed in 
1940 hence did not change the emotional position of the applicants. Thus, it could not 
be held that “the applicants’ suffering reached a dimension and character distinct from 
the emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably caused to relatives of victims 
of a serious human rights violation” (para. 188). What was striking to the chamber turned 
out to be nothing to the Grand Chamber. I write not another word on this…
The four judges who did not agree with the judgment appended a virulent joint 
dissenting opinion to it (Ineta Ziemele, Latvia; Vincent A. de Gaetano, Malta; Julia 
Laffranque, Estonia and Helen Keller, Switzerland). As a diligent reader of the Stras-
bourg rulings, I have read only a few other opinions of such strength and emotion. The 
joint dissent deserves a fuller description and treatment, but as this article has its space 
limitations, I limit myself to reproducing only a few selected quotations. 
The dissenting judges wrote that the Grand Chamber in the Katyń judgment: “has 
missed an opportunity to (…) uphold the ‘Convention values’ clause in the Šilih prin-
ciples. In doing so, it has deprived that clause of its humanitarian effect in the case at 
hand and potentially weakened its effect in the event of its future application. This 
approach is untenable if the Convention system is to fulfil the role for which it was 
intended: to provide a Court that would act as a ‘conscience’ for Europe”. And fur-
ther: “We regret the majority’s interpretation of the humanitarian clause in the most 
non-humanitarian way”. And still further: “We express our profound disagreement and 
dissatisfaction with the findings of the majority in this case, a case of most hideous 
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human rights violations, which turn the applicants’ long history of justice delayed into 
a permanent case of justice denied.”
7. if i had Known…
The Grand Chamber judgment came like a bolt from the blue. In my darkest sce-
nario I did not imagine that the seventeen judges might find no violation of Article 3. 
But it happened. It is also striking that the Grand Chamber found, for the first time in 
its history, a separate violation of Article 38. The State’s obligation of co-operation with 
the Court is auxiliary to the task of determining if there was a violation of one or more 
of the substantive provisions of the Convention. Therefore in its previous case law, if 
a state’s failure to submit information or documents to the Court resulted in a finding 
of a breach of Article 38, the Court also drew inferences as to the well-foundedness of 
the allegations raised under other provisions of the Convention. In the Katyń judgment 
the Grand Chamber decided differently, while at the same time it made the obligation 
under Article 38 absolute. Thus, the lesson given by the Strasbourg Court is clear and 
simple: even if the Court eventually declares it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the 
applicants’ substantive grievances, there is a violation of Article 38 if the state does not 
comply with the Court’s order to submit requested information. 
The allegation raised under Article 38 was not at heart of the Katyń complaint. In 
2004 the relatives of the Katyń victims suddenly heard that the case had been closed 
and the investigation’s findings would not be available as it would compromise Russia’s 
core national security interests. Then came the refusal of rehabilitations and statements 
denying the reality of the Katyń massacre, even suggesting that the killings, “if they had 
hypothetically happened”, might have been justified. Strasbourg seemed to be the last 
resort for assistance. Eventually to no avail. 
Is the Court prepared to repeat its conclusions if there are analogous acts and state-
ments of state authorities regarding the reality of the Holocaust? If it is to be conse-
quent, it should. 
If only I had known what the Katyń judgment rendered by the Grand Chamber 
would be… On many occasions I am asked this question. The European Court of Hu-
man Rights was to be a court of conscience. The Convention was enacted in the face 
of heinous atrocities committed by two totalitarian regimes, and it was to prevent such 
horrible acts from occurring again. The final Katyń judgment does not testify to the 
truth of this supposition.
The chamber’s Katyń judgment fell only one step short from giving full satisfaction 
to the applicants. If I had known the subsequent Grand Chamber judgment, I would 
have gone with the Katyń complaint to the United Nations Committee of Human 
Rights. And when asked today by people who have serious grievances related to the 
way the Russian authorities answer to their “historical inquiries” I answer: think about 
Geneva rather than Strasbourg.
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